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The Enforcement of Arbitration in International
Commercial Disputes: LT.A.D. Associates, Inc.
v. Podar Brothers
In I TA.D. Associates, Inc. v. PodarBrothers,I the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit engaged in its first review of the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 2 as applied to a commercial contract between an American company and a foreign partnership. Its decision reinforces a strong
judicial trend toward recognition of the greater importance of arbitration in international commerce than in domestic commerce.3 The
court's opinion protects the enforcement of international arbitral agreements and awards under United States law, thereby encouraging American involvement in international commerce.
The I TA.D. dispute presented the court with three issues: (1) at
what point, if ever, might a party be deemed to have waived the right to
arbitration where there exists an international arbitration agreement;
(2) whether the federal courts have the discretion, rather than the duty,
to mandate arbitration where such an agreement exists; and (3) whether
the federal courts may uphold a prejudgment attachment on the assets of
one of the parties or on a superseding bond which releases those assets,
pending arbitration on an international commercial contract that calls
for arbitration.
The Fourth Circuit relied on the Convention, which the United
States had ratified in 1970, and on the accompanying Foreign Arbitration Act, 4 which was added as a separate chapter to the Arbitration Act
of 1925 to establish the statutory authority for enforcement of the Convention in the federal courts. The Fourth Circuit construed the Conven1 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981).
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as the
Convention]. The Convention was ratified by the United States, effective December 29, 1970.
3 Two Supreme Court decisions establishing the special status of arbitration in international commerce have been augmented by several lower court decisions. See Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
Illustrative cases in the lower courts include: Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d
Cir. 1975); McCreary Tire and Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974);
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de l'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969
(2d Cir. 1974); Ferrara S.p.A. v. United States Grain Growers, 441 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), aff'd mem., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1977).
4 Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08
(1976)) [hereinafter cited as the Foreign Arbitration Act].
2
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tion and the Act to conclude first, that a party's conduct could constitute
a waiver of the right to arbitration but that the facts were insufficient for
such a waiver in this case. Second, the court held that once it is established no waiver has occurred, the federal courts are obligated to refer
the parties to arbitration and do not have the discretion to retain jurisdiction when the arbitration agreement is covered by the Convention.
The only discretion resting in the federal courts is to designate the place
for arbitration and to appoint arbitrators. Third, the prejudgment attachment and subsequent bond posted in this case were held to be inconsistent with the arbitration agreement and with the Convention.
I.T.A.D., a New York-based textile marketing corporation, had originally sued Podar, an Indian textile marketing partnership, in a South
Carolina court in July 1976. 5 This breach of contract action was based
on two agreements which I.T.A.D. had made with Podar in December
1975 and January 1976 for the purchase of textiles. Both agreements
provided for the arbitration of all disputes between the parties, but with
one discrepancy: I.T.A.D.'s purchase orders for the two agreements identified New York as the situs for arbitration, whereas Podar's contract
forms identified Bombay as the situs. 6 Podar subsequently failed to deliver the textiles, allegedly because of quota restrictions imposed by the
Government of India. 7 Instead of submitting the matter to arbitration
pursuant to their contracts, I.T.A.D. decided to sue Podar in South Carolina. 8 The state court granted I.T.A.D.'s request for the attachment of
another Podar shipment which happened to be in the port of Charleston
at the time. 9
Podar's initial response was to file a pro se reply affidavit which included an objection to the action on the grounds that it was barred by
the arbitration agreement. Apparently the South Carolina court made
no ruling on this point and simply set a trial date, which was postponed
several times at Podar's request. Meanwhile, Podar posted a $50,000
bond to release the attachment in June 1978.10 Finally, on September
11, 1979, one day before the final trial date in the South Carolina court,
the court granted Podar's motion to remove the case to federal district
court, which it was required to do at the request of the defendant under
the Foreign Arbitration Act.' 1
In the federal district court, Podar's motion of January 2, 1980, to
compel arbitration pursuant to the Act was denied. 12 That court ruled
that Podar had waived its right to compel arbitration by virtue of its

5

636 F.2d at 76.
6 Id.

Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11
12

Id. 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1976) was the authority for removal.
636 F.2d at 76.
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waiting so long to make the motion and that the federal court retained
discretionary authority to compel or deny arbitration.' 3 Podar appealed
this order to the Fourth Circuit, which reversed the lower court on both
the waiver and the court's discretionary authority holdings, remanded
the case to resolve the conflict over the situs of arbitration, and ordered
the lower court to release the bond.
The Fourth Circuit addressed the issues of waiver and discretionary
authority in some detail, while its order for releasing the bond only cited
one precedent. 14 In general, the opinion emphasized that American
adoption of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards reflected a strong commitment by the government
to encourage international arbitration. The court found that, although
15
Article 11(3) of the Convention could be interpreted to allow waivers,
Podar's delay in moving for arbitration did not fit the waiver provisions
of the Article, especially since Podar had raised the issue of arbitration in
its initial response to I.T.A.D.'s complaint. 16 Although three years had
elapsed since I.T.A.D. brought the action against Podar, the court further noted that section 205 of the Foreign Arbitration Act allows a defendant to remove an action or proceeding pending in a state court to a
federal district court "at any time before the trial thereof.' 7 Thus, as
long as a trial has not begun in a state court, a defendant's right to remove the case to a federal district court and to have that court order
arbitration must necessarily be preserved. The court also ruled that the
district court could not deny a request for an order to arbitrate, even
though the language of section 206 of the Act' 8 seems to allow such an
order to be discretionary.' 9 The court pointed out that Article 11(3) of
the Convention does make such a referral mandatory in the absence of
stated exceptions. 20 Therefore, because the Act implemented the Confound the
vention, the two must be considered together, and the court
21
combination to require mandatory referral to arbitration.
13 Id.

14 McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974).
15The pertinent language of Article 11(3) requires arbitration "unless... the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." The Convention, supra
note 2, art. 11(3).

16 636 F.2d at 77.
17 Id. at 76 n.1, citing 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1976).
18 Section 206 of the Foreign Arbitration Act reads, "A court having jurisdiction under
this chapter may direct that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any place
therein provided for, whether that place is within or without the United States. Such Court may

also appoint arbitrators in accordance with the provisions of the agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 206
(1976) (emphasis added).
19 636 F.2d at 77.
20 Article 11(3) of the Convention reads in part: "The court of the Contracting State,
when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement
within the meaning of this Article, shall at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to

arbitration." The Convention, note 2, art. 11(3) (emphasis added). See infra notes 82-90 and
accompanying text.
21 636 F.2d at 77.

108

N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

The court's decision in respect to the three issues of waiver, discretionary referral, and prejudgment attachment reflects the special status
that international arbitration has attained in U.S. courts in recent years.
The special status is notable, not only because U.S. courts have been slow
to recognize arbitration in general, but also because the United States
delayed ratification of the Arbitration Convention for well over ten years
after it had gone into effect for other signatories who had ratified it. The
significance of the court's decision in this case, therefore, must be evaluated in the context of past judicial reluctance to endorse arbitration as an
alternative to adjudication and the government's recognition of this reluctance. Each of the three issues the court faced will be evaluated following a brief review of the history of American judicial treatment of
international arbitration.
The traditional hostility of U.S. courts toward arbitration seems to
be part of the Anglo-American heritage and its preference for elaborate
legal procedures based on precedent as well as flexibility in the evolution
of a common law. 22 Because arbitration is intended to be a more efficient alternative to adjudication, its basic rules emphasize speed, informality, privacy, technical expertise, and finality. 23 Thus, judicial review
of arbitral awards is limited to such matters as fairness of the proceeding
and the jurisdictional scope of the arbitration agreement and does not
address the correctness of the findings of law or fact. 24 This constraint on
judicial review goes against the grain of the common law fabric, and
until the 1920's, the court often applied the "ouster" doctrine to strike
25
down arbitration agreements.
The pressure to legitimize arbitration first prevailed in New York,
where an arbitration act was passed in 1921.26 Ultimately twenty-two
states enacted arbitration statutes, 27 while at the federal level, Congress
adopted the United States Arbitration Act in 1925.28 Although the Federal Arbitration Act was written to have general effect, judicial reluctance to recognize it as an alternative to adjudication resulted in the
22 This "judicial hostility" is well documented in Mirabito, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The First Four Years, 5
Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 471 (1975).
23 The advantages and disadvantages of arbitration are well presented in Evans & Ellis,
International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparison of Legal Regimes, 8 Tex. Int'l L.J. 17
(1973); McClelland, International Arbitration: A Practical Guide for the Effective Use of the
System for Litigation of International Commercial Disputes, 12 Int'l L. 83 (1978); Sanders, A
Twenty Year's Review of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 Int'l L. 269 (1979).
24 Friedman, Correcting Arbitral Error: The Limited Scope of Judicial Review, 33 Arb. J.
9 (1978); Yarowsky, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of
Power and Finality, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 936 (1976).
25 5 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 257, 258 (1975).
26 Arbitration Law of 1920, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws (current version at N.Y. Civ. Prac.
law §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980)).
27 Mirabito, supra note 22, at 472.
28 Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (substantially similar current version at 9 U.S.C.
1-14 (1976)).
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carving out of several exceptions, involving, for example, disputes affecting securities,2 9 antitrust,3 0 and patents, 3 1 where public policy interests
were deemed to require adjudication rather than arbitration.
Internationally, the League of Nations recognized arbitration as an
appropriate method for resolving disputes among private parties in
transnational settings. The 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration
Clauses32 and the 1927 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign
Arbitral Awards 33 were promulgated to stimulate the recognition by nations of each other's arbitral awards. The United States never ratified
the Protocol or the Convention, largely because Congress considered
34
them to be in conflict with existing state laws.
In the 1950's, the United Nations sponsored a revision of the Geneva
Protocol and Convention, which resulted in the 1958 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, otherwise
known as the New York Convention. 35 The work was done by the Private International Law Committee and focused on arbitral awards, but
was subsequently redrafted to provide for the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements as well, even though the title of the Convention continued to refer only to awards. 36 The United States was a
reluctant participant in the deliberations 37 and decided initially to oppose the Convention, again largely because of the conflict with many
3
state arbitration laws.
The American refusal to adopt the Convention made it difficult for
U.S. businesses to persuade foreign courts to enforce American arbitral
awards.3 9 Groups like the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association, the United States Branch of the International
Chamber of Commerce, and the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission urged the President and Congress to change the U.S.
position. 4° Finally, in 1968, President Johnson recommended the ratifi29 A significant Supreme Court case requiring adjudication of a securities dispute in spite

of an international arbitration agreement is Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).

30 See, e.g., Am. Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Macquire &Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968).

31 See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Development Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th
Cir. 1970).
32 Adopted Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 157.
33 Adopted Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301.
34 Contini, International Commercial Arbitration, 8 Am. J. Comp. L. 283, 287-90 (1959).
35 The Convention, supra note 2.
36 Comment, United Nations Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention: United States Accession, 2 Calif. W. Int'l L.J. 67, 70 (1971).
37 Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L.J. 1049, 1074-75 (1961).
38 Official Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration, No. 22 (Aug. 11, 1958).
39 Domke, American Arbitral Awards: Enforcement in Foreign Countries, 1965 U. Ill.
L.F. 399, 400 (1965).
40 H.R. Rep. No. 1181, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3601.
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cation of the New York Convention, and Congress approved the proposal on October 4, 1968. 4 1 Proposed legislation to implement the
Convention was drafted as a series of amendments to the Federal Arbitration Act. 42 Congress did not adopt these amendments, however, for
fear of disrupting accepted judicial interpretations of the Act's wording
in domestic arbitration cases. Instead, Congress finally enacted a revised
version which set up a separate chapter to the Act for implementation of
the Convention, 43 which established a 1970 effective date.
A turning point on the way to American ratification was the 1967
Supreme Court decision in PrinaPaint Corp. v. Floodand Conk/'n Manufactun'g Co. 44 Until that time, lower courts had sometimes refused to recog-

nize that the Federal Arbitration Act made arbitration the subject of
federal substantive law in diversity cases. In Pnima Paint the Supreme
Court held that it was appropriate to apply federal substantive law on
arbitration where jurisdiction was based solely on diversity. 45 American
reluctance to ratify the Arbitration Convention had been based on
problems of implementation if the courts had to rely on state law to interpret international arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court's ruling in PrinaPaint removed a major barrier tofederal implementation of
the Convention by making it possible for international arbitration to operate as a federal question, preempting state law, 46 and it facilitated
President Johnson's recommendation to ratify the Convention in 1968.
The Supreme Court also proved to be receptive to the unique role of
international commercial agreements, even independent of the Foreign
Arbitration Act of 1970. For example, in a 1972 case which was not
covered by the Convention, 47 the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a
choice of forum clause in a transnational contract 48 even though such
clauses in domestic contracts had generally been denied legal effect as an
arbitrary limitation on the jurisdiction of the courts. 49 Then, in 1974,
See Comment, supra note 36, at 73.
This legislation was prepared by the American Bar Association but was never introduced. Id.
43 See Foreign Arbitration Act, supra note 4.
U.S. 393 (1967)
4388
45 Id. at 405. Justice Fortas argued that the statute "is based upon and confined to the
incontestable federal foundations of" the interstate commerce power and the admiralty power
of Congress. Id. Justice Black (joined by Justices Douglas and Stewart) wrote a strong dissent
in which he pointed out:
[the court] is not content to hold that the Act does all it was intended to do: make
arbitration agreements enforceable in federal courts if they are valid and legally
existent under state law. The Court holds that the Act gives federal courts the
right to fashion federal law, inconsistent with state law, to determine whether an
arbitration agreement was made and what it means.
Id. at 422. An excellent analysis of the jurisdictional problems between state and federal arbitration law is found in McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 26 Arb. J. 65, 74 (1971).
46 Mirabito, supra note 22, at 473.
47 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
41

42

4 Id. at 9.
49

Id. at 13-15.
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the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Scherk v. A/lberto-Culver
Co. ,50 which authorized arbitration for an international dispute over securities because the contract between the parties contained an international arbitration agreement. 5 ' This opinion came as a surprise 52 in light
of the Supreme Court's 1953 ruling in Wilko v. Swan 53 that a securities
dispute was nonarbitrable in spite of the fact that the parties had an
arbitration agreement to cover securities disputes.34
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Scherk, distinguished
'55
Wiko by calling the Scherk contract "a truly international agreement.
Justice Stewart pointed out that "[s]uch a contract involves considerations and policies significantly different from those found controlling in
Wilko.*56 For example, uncertainty as to which country's laws might be
applicable and the dangers of a forum hostile to one of the parties in a
dispute made it "an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of
the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business
transaction" to have an advance agreement on how disputes are to be
resolved. 5 7 Finally, Justice Stewart argued, "[a] parochial refusal by the
courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration agreement
would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite unseemly and
jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation
mutually destructive
'58
advantages."
Scherk was decided under the United States Arbitration Act. Justice
Stewart recognized, however, the special significance of the Convention
and the Foreign Arbitration Act in the following statement, which was
quoted by the I TA.D. court:
The goal of the Convention and the principal purpose underlying American adoption and implementation of it, was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in
international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements
and arbitration awards are enforced in the sigto arbitrate are observed
59
natory countries.
This very strong language in support of the Convention recognizes a special status for arbitration agreements and awards covered by it, regardless of how the courts might restrict the operation of domestic arbitration
agreements. 6° Subsequent lower court cases have reflected this higher
50 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
51 Id. at 515-17.
52 Nissen, Antitrust and Arbitration in International Commerce, 17 Harv. Int'l LJ. 110
(1976); Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Securities Law Denied: Arbitration
Clause in Investment Contract Enforced, 16 Harv. Int'l L.J. 705 (1975); Note, Greater Certainty in International Transactions through Choices of Forum?, 69 Am. J. Int'l L. 366 (1975).

53 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
54 Id. at 434-35, 438.
55 417 U.S. at 515 (1974).

56
57
5
59

Id.
Id. at 516.
Id. at 516-17.
Id. at 520 n.15.

60 One should note that Scwr'k involved an action under § 10-b and rule 10(b)(5) of the
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regard for international arbitration agreements, often narrowly defining
public policy interests which might otherwise supersede such
61
agreements.
The Convention currently has fifty-six contracting members, including the United States and India, the home countries of the I TA.D. parties. 62 Both the United States and India took advantage of two available
reservations to the Convention, one limiting the Convention to arbitration involving commercial transactions, and the other limiting it on the
basis of reciprocity. 63 Thus, the parties in I TA.D. are in similar positions in relation to the Convention.
The Fourth Circuit in I TA.D. was clearly sympathetic to the promotion and protection of international arbitration agreements. Despite
the informality of the agreement to arbitrate found in the contracts between I.T.A.D. and Podar, the court still accorded it full recognition.64
At no time was the agreement itself challenged, and the issues in the case
encompassed events which happened after the agreement had been
65
made.
The first of the three issues before the court was whether Podar had
waived the right to arbitrate through its failure to make a motion to
compel arbitration before January 1980. The Fourth Circuit relied on
Article 11(3) of the Convention and Section 206 of the Act66 to find that
no waiver had occurred. The court emphasized the need for uniform
standards for determining when a waiver has occurred in international
agreements. The court was rather vague, however, on what those stan67
dards might be and referred only to its discussion in a prior case "of
circumstances which indicate a waiver of an arbitration agreement." 6
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which has no private remedy provision, in contrast to Wilko
which involved § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 513. However, absent an interna-

tional arbitration agreement, Rule 10(b)(5) disputes are still being ruled non-arbitrable. See
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978); Weissbuch
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977).

61 See supra note 3; McClelland supra note 23; Ehrenhaft, Effective International Commercial Arbitration, 9 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1191 (1977); Smedresman, Conflict of Laws in
International Commercial Arbitration: A Survey of Recent Developments, 7 Calif. W. Int'l L.J.
263 (1977).
62 U.S. Dep't of State, Treaties in Force 252 (1981).
63 The Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(3).
64 636 F.2d at 76, 77. Both parties apparently had a provision for arbitration in their
standard commercial forms, but they either neglected to scrutinize each other's forms or chose
to leave the discrepancy on situs of arbitration unresolved. Arbitration is a common industrial
practice in the textile trade. See Lowenfeld, Book Review (International Commercial Arbitration by Giorgio Gaja) 3 Arb. J. 38 (1979). It may well be that I.T.A.D. and Podar took an
agreement to arbitrate for granted.
65 636 F.2d at 76, 77.
66 The Convention, supra note 2, art. 11(3); 9 US.C. § 206 (1976).
67 City of Parkersburg v. Turner Constr. Co., 612 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1980). For further
discussion of circumstances indicating a waiver of an arbitration agreement, see E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Lyles & Lang Constr. Co., 219 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1955); Radiator Specialty
Co. v. Cannon Mills, 97 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1938).
68 636 F.2d at 77.

ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

In this prior domestic case the Fourth Circuit held that a time limit in
the arbitration agreement for initiating arbitration would be applied
only "if practicable" and only for minor issues.6 9 "An honest misappraisal of the appropriate remedy" in a dispute over a major issue did
not, the court argued, justify using the lapse of the time limit as an ex70
cuse not to arbitrate.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit seemed to consider delays in requesting
arbitration to constitute a waiver of the right to arbitrate only where the
issue is minor, quick action is "practicable" to invoke the request, and
the failure to ask for arbitration is not based on an honest misunderstanding of how to proceed. Because the case cited by the court involved
two domestic parties, the court's reference to it implied that the standards for waiver were the same in either a domestic or international contract setting, even though the court also recognized "the strong policy
favoring [international] arbitration ....
,'71 Thus, the court left unclear
just how "standards which can be uniformly applied on an international
72
scale" might differ from domestic standards.
Two factors not brought out in the opinion but which reinforce the
ruling are the strong federal policy in general to minimize waivers of
arbitration agreements and the greater willingness to minimize them in
international commercial settings. 73 On arbitration generally, the federal statute provides that a written arbitration agreement "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract. ' 74 These grounds usually have
involved fraud in obtaining the arbitration clause or lack of consideration or capacity to contract.7 5 Only an extensive delay before demanding arbitration has been held to operate as a waiver.76
Under the Foreign Arbitration Act, even an extensive delay might
not constitute a wavier if the proceeding were in a state court, because
section 205 allows the defendant to request a transfer of the proceeding
to a federal district court at any time before a trial. 77 Excessive delay
could operate as a waiver only after the initiation of proceedings in a
69 City of Parkersburg v. Turner Constr. Co., 612 F.2d at 156.
70 Id.
71 636 F.2d at 77.
72 Id. at 77.
73 Ferro S.p.A. v. United States Grain Growers, 441 F. Supp. 778, 780 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), affd mem., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978).

74 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
75 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
76 United States v. S.T.C. Constr. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1023 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Here the demand for arbitration came long after the suit was commenced and extensive discovery had been
conducted. See also Radiator Speciality Co. v. Cannon Mills, 97 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1938); La
Nacional Platanera, S.C.L. v. North Am. Fruit & S.S. Corp., 84 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1936); Batson
Yarn & Fabrics Mach. Group, Inc. v. Saurer-Allma Gmb H-Allgauer Maschinenbau, 311 F.
Supp. 68 (D.S.C. 1970); Gulf Cent. Pipeline Co. v. Motor Vessel Lake Placid, 315 F. Supp. 974

(E.D. La. 1970).
77 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1976), applied in Dale Metal Corp. v. Kiwa Chemical Indus. Co., 442

F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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federal court, if this section is to have full effect. The Fourth Circuit's
ruling could be read to mean that only upon the involvement of a federal
forum would "standards which can be uniformly applied on an international scale" 8 be applied on the issue of a waiver. Furthermore, the language in the Convention requires referral to arbitration unless the court
finds the arbitration agreement to be "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." '79 This language differs from the language in
the first chapter of the United States Arbitration Act and appears to
provide quite a different basis for limiting the grounds for denying the
than exists under the
right to arbitrate under an international8 agreement
0
federal statute for domestic arbitration.
In addition to deciding whether Podar had waived its arbitration
rights, the Fourth Circuit considered whether federal courts possessed
discretionary power in ordering arbitration. The Fourth Circuit correctly pointed out that the Convention does make referral mandatory
and that the apparently discretionary language in section 206 of the Act
"relates only to the designation of a place for arbitration and the appointment of arbitrators."I No documentation is offered by the court
on this point, and the statute's language----"A court

. . .

may direct that

arbitration be held . . ."82-does appear to be discretionary.
In fact, however, the provision was not intended to be discretion83
ary. The purpose of the language was not to authorize a public policy
balancing test between adjudication and arbitration, as one commentator has argued.8 4 Rather, Congress used the word "may" because the
Office of the Legal Advisor for the State Department requested inclusion
of the section so that federal courts would be authorized to order arbitration "at any place" provided for in the applicable agreement, "whether
that place is within or without the United States."'85 According to Richard D. Kearny of the Office of the State Department's Legal Adviser at
the time the bill was before Congress, there was concern that district
courts would not order arbitration outside the United States without this
authorization because, under the existing arbitration statute, "the case
law is not clear whether the district court will order an arbitration to be
78 636 F.2d at 77.
79 The Convention, supra note 2, art. 11(3).

80 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Although this language has the potential for
broad interpretation, it is different from the pre-existing language in Chapter One and therefore
must be interpreted according to its own language rather than the case law under Chapter One.
81 636 F.2d at 77.
82 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1976) (emphasis added).
83 The confusion is enhanced by the fact that the original United States Arbitration Act
of the proceedings if the dispute is arbitrable under a written agreement. 9
mandates a stay

U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
8 Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Securities Law Denied: Arbitration
Clause in Investment Contract Enforced, 16 Harv. Int'l LJ.705, 718 (1975).
85 The circumstances of the request are discussed in Comment, supra note 36, at 79; McMahon, supra note 45, at 80.
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held outside the United States."'8 6 The section was needed to clarify this
issue. Thus, the use of the word "may" was intended to give the courts
discretion regarding the place of arbitration, but not discretion on
whether arbitration should occur. Furthermore, the Convention already
contained language making it clear that courts are required to "refer the
parties to arbitration" where an arbitration agreement exists. 8 7 Taken
together, the Convention mandates referral and section 206 of the statute
makes it possible for federal courts to order the arbitration wherever the
parties have agreed that it should take place. The section further authorizes the federal courts to "appoint arbitrators in accordance with the
provisions of the agreement," 8 8 which is also enabling language and not

a grant of power to decide whether to order arbitration.
Thus, the enabling provision was not a shift to discretionary referral,
but was intended to be discretionary only with regard to the location and
the appointment of arbitrators. This interpretation has since been recognized by several decisions, 8 9 and it was appropriate for the Fourth Circuit to remand this case for the very function of resolving the location of
arbitration. 9°
The third issue considered by the Fourth Circuit was the district
court's power to order the attachment of Podar's goods and the superseding bond. The lower court was instructed to release and refund the bond
to Podar, 9 1 with the Fourth Circuit basing its instruction on McCreaq,Tire
& Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A. 92 In McCreagy, the Third Circuit had ordered a similar release of an attachment by a Pennsylvania court because
86 S. Rep. No. 702, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970). There is some confusion on this point
because the Acting Secretary of State for Congressional Relations stated a misleadingly con-

trary purpose in a letter to Speaker John McCormack, as follows: "Since there may be circumstances in which it would be highly desirable to direct arbitration within the district in which
the action is brought and inappropriate to direct arbitration abroad, Section 206 is permissive
rather than mandatory." Letter to Speaker John W. McCormack from H.G. Torbert, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, in H.R. Rep. No. 118,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3601, 3604.

87 The Convention, supra note 2, art. 11(3).
88 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).
89 McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1037 (3d Cir. 1974);
Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Maritima S.A., 477 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Siderius v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico S.A., 453 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Antco
Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Siderman S.p.A., 417 F. Supp. 207, 215 (S.D.N.Y 1976).
90 On remand, the district court ordered that the arbitration take place in New York City.
I.T.A.D. Associates, Inc. v. Podar Brothers, No. 79-1819 (D.S.C. June 25, 1981). Judge Hawkins supported this choice over Bombay because "the body which was designated in Podar's
arbitration clause as the arbitration tribunal in Bombay is the same entity being relied upon by
Podar to support its allegation of a legal excuse for failure to perform its contracts,. . . [making] a fair and impartial hearing" very unlikely, and because I.T.A.D. and a third party affected
by the alleged breach both have their principal offices in New York City, and Podar apparently
has "a representative located there." Id. at 3. It is interesting to note that Judge Hawkins also
ordered that the "arbitration be conducted in accordance with the laws of the State of New
York and the rules then obtaining of the General Arbitration Council of the Textile Industry."

Id.
91 636 F.2d at.77.
92 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974).
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it was deemed to conflict with the Convention's requirement to arbitrate. 93 Because the Convention mandates referral to arbitration, and
because there is no provision in the Foreign Arbitration Act for a stay of
the judicial proceeding pending arbitration, as there is in the statute for
domestic arbitration, 94 the McCreaq court concluded that its jurisdiction
was limited to ordering referral. This is in contrast to the procedure
under the domestic arbitration statute, wherein a court may order a stay
of judicial proceedings pending arbitration, and thereby maintain a prejudgment attachment. 95
This appears to be a reasonable position calculated to encourage
international arbitration. The Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York has since taken the same position. 96 In both cases,
the absence of any reference to prejudgment attachments
in the Conven97
tion was deemed to mean they were not authorized.
Except in maritime cases, 98 only one court has taken a contrary position on prejudgment attachments. In Carolina Power & Light Co. v.

Uranex,99 a federal district court in California justified a temporary attachment of assets as an inducement for Uranex to arbitrate.' °° This
decision was criticized in a recent law review note on jurisdictional
grounds.' 0 ' The attachment was the only facet of the dispute between
the parties in the jurisdiction of that court, with arbitration already proceeding in New York City.' 0 2 The court argued that the Convention
and implementing statute did not specifically prohibit prejudgment at93 Id. at 1038.

94 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
95 501 F.2d at 1037-38.
96 Metropolitan World Tanker Corp. v. P.N. Pertambangan Minijakdangas Bumi Nasional, 427 F. Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
97 Id. at 4-5; 501 F.2d at 1038.
98 Prejudgment attachment in admiralty cases is specifically authorized by the United
States Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 8 (1976). The Foreign Arbitration Act, supra note 4, stipulates that Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act is applicable where it "is not in conflict with
this chapter or the Convention as ratified by the United States." 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1976). Relying on these two sections, courts have generally upheld prejudgment attachments in admiralty
cases even though the arbitration agreements in such cases are covered by the Convention. Drys
Shipping Corp. v. Freights, 558 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1977); Paramount Carriers Corp. v. Cook
Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Atlas Chartering Serv., Inc. v. World Trade
Group, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Andros Compania Maratima S.A. v. Andre &
Cie S.A., 430 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see Sanko S.S. Co. v. Newfoundland Ref. Co.,
411 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 538 F.2d 313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976);
Metropolitan World Tanker Corp. v. P.N. Pertambangan Minijakdangas Bumi Nasional, 427
F. Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court in this last case pointed out that attachments in maritime cases are usually intended to provide jurisdiction in rem or by foreign attachment. Id. at 4.
99 Carolina Power & Light Co v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
100 Id. at 1051. The attachment was authorized for a 30-day period only.
101 Note, Carolina Power and Lighi Co. v. Uratex." Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction to Secure a
Potential Arbitral Award: An Exception to Shaffer v. Heilner'sMinimum Contacts Requirement,
5 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 247 (1980). But see Note, Pre-Arbitration Attachment: Is It
Available in International Disputes?, I Rev. Litig. 211 (1981).
102 451 F. Supp. at 1045. The court even recognized the jurisdictional dilemma posed by
the Supreme Court's ruling in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The temporary nature of
its order was to allow the plaintiff time to bring another suit where it could assert personal
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tachments and that the accepted practice of allowing such attachments
to protect a future arbitration award in domestic arbitration was not
barred in this case.' 0 3 The Uranex rationale contradicts the whole point
of the consolidated handling of disputes through arbitration. The
Fourth Circuit correctly chose to ignore the decision and instead to add
to favor prejudgment attachments
its weight to the emerging trend not
0 4
pending international arbitration.1
The Fourth Circuit's resolution of the three issues of waiver,
mandatory referral, and prejudgment attachment will encourage the development of international arbitration as a dispute settling mechanism.
The court's opinion is a reasonable interpretation of the Convention and
the Foreign Arbitration Act and conforms to the basic policies favoring
international arbitration.
In regard to the waiver issue, Podar was operating at a considerable
disadvantage by virtue of being based in India and initially responded to
05
I.T.A.D.'s complaint with an affidavit prepared by its Indian counsel.
Although the affidavit referred to Podar's understanding of an agreement to arbitrate, the motion to compel arbitration was not made until
the case had been removed to federal district court some three and a half
years later. The Fourth Circuit nonetheless recognized that the removal
was proper. The question of when a motion to compel arbitration should
be made depends on such strategic factors as out-of-court negotiations to
bring about arbitration voluntarily, the risk of acquiescing to a state
court's jurisdiction unnecessarily, and the likelihood that the arbitration
agreement will or will not be upheld as valid. I.T.A.D. had sued for
breach of contract in the South Carolina court in spite of an apparent
agreement to arbitrate, and these factors may well have influenced
Podar's delays. The fact that the Foreign Arbitration Act authorizes removal from a state court to a federal court at any time prior to trial
conforms with a policy of acknowledging these strategic problems.
Once a federal court has jurisdiction to order arbitration under the
Convention, the requirement that the court shall refer the parties to arbitration is also a wise policy. If the discretionary scope of section 206 of
the Act were broadened by judicial interpretation from the limited authority to identify a situs of arbitration and to appoint arbitrators in conformity with the arbitration agreement, to encompass a more general
authority to decide whether to order arbitration at all, it would be in
direct conflict with the Convention's mandatory language. Not only
would this offend the other contracting parties to the Convention and
place the United States in the awkward position of justifying judicial
jurisdiction over the defendant, in line with the Supreme Court ruling, but also in spite of the
fact that arbitration had already begun. Id. at 1049.
103 451 F. Supp. at 1050, 1052.
104 See, supra notes 92 and 96.
105 Brief of Appellant at 9, I.T.A.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir.
1981).
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rulings in conflict with the Convention; it would also discourage American involvement in international commerce. Arbitration agreements are
a convenient mechanism to avoid the potential uncertainties, inconsistencies, and bias of subjecting commerical disputes to the laws of one of
the parties. Instead, the parties can agree in advance to a mutually acceptable forum for resolving their disputes.
Of course, I.T.A.D. and Podar had not agreed on a mutually acceptable forum. Both parties relied on conflicting boiler plate arbitration
clauses in their respective business forms, although neither party questioned the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. The absence of agreement on situs also meant the absence of agreement on the rules to govern
the arbitration. The basic purpose of avoiding the vagaries of one country's laws by having an arbitration agreement was thus not realized.
Even so, the policy of encouraging arbitration for the sake of comity in
international commerce justified the I TA.D. outcome.
The prejudgment attachment in the South Carolina court, was part
of a proceeding in which I.T.A.D. was suing Podar for breach of contract. Moreover, it served as the basis for asserting jurisdiction over
Podar in the state court. Thus, the attachment was intermingled with
actions which were contrary to the arbitration agreement. It conflicted
with the policy that arbitration should serve as the preferred setting for
the settlement of international commercial disputes when the parties
have an agreement to arbitrate. And it conflicted with the limited role
for the courts under the Convention. The Fourth Circuit acted properly
in ordering that the bond posted by Podar to supersede the attachment
be released.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit emphasized the importance of uniform
standards in the operation of international arbitration but neglected to
identify the source of these standards in any more detail than the broad
language of the Convention. There are, in fact, several sources of more
detailed rules for arbitration than the Convention provides.t°6 In addition, each country tends to have its own variations. 10 7 The trend in most
countries is toward international uniformity, and some analysts see this
as reflecting the development of an international arbitration law. 108 The
language of the Fourth Circuit's opinion is supportive of the internationalizing of arbitration law even if the authorities it cites, with the excep106 The International Chamber of Commerce and the American Arbitration Association
are the two largest private agencies providing arbitration services. Each has an elaborate set of
rules. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law has also promulgated rules
on arbitration although it does not provide an arbitration service.
107 Examples are discussed in Evans & Ellis, supra note 23; Comment, A Survey of Arbitral
Forums: Their Significance and Procedure, 5 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 219 (1980); Almond,
Settlement of International Commercial Disputes, 4 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 107 (1978).
108 McClelland, Toward a More Mature System of International Commercial Arbitration:
The Establishment of Uniform Rules of Procedure and the Elimination of the Conflict of Laws
Question, 5 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 169 (1980); Smedresman, supra note 61; Ehrenhaft,
supra note 61.
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tion of the Convention itself, are domestic. The fact that the Fourth
Circuit favored international uniformity and ruled accordingly in this
case is a welcome sign.
KATHERINE HAGEN SEBO

